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Architectural Backdoors for Within-Batch Data Stealing and Model Inference Manipulation

Nicolas Küchler, Ivan Petrov, Conrad Grobler, Ilia Shumailov

2025-05-27

Architectural Backdoors for Within-Batch Data Stealing and Model
  Inference Manipulation

Summary

This paper talks about a new type of security risk in neural networks, where attackers can secretly add backdoors to the model's design that let them steal data or change results when the model processes multiple inputs at once.

What's the problem?

The problem is that as neural networks are used more and more for things like image recognition and language processing, they often handle lots of data at the same time, called batch processing. Attackers have found ways to hide backdoors in the network's architecture, which can leak private information or let them mess with what the model outputs, putting user privacy and trust at risk.

What's the solution?

The authors show how these architectural backdoors work and demonstrate the dangers by running experiments. They also suggest a way to defend against these attacks using Information Flow Control, which helps keep data secure by making sure information only moves in safe, approved ways inside the model.

Why it matters?

This is important because it helps people understand new threats to AI systems and offers a practical way to make them safer, protecting users from having their data stolen or manipulated without their knowledge.

Abstract

A novel class of backdoors in neural network architectures exploits batched inference to enable large-scale data manipulation, demonstrating information leakage and control over user inputs and outputs, with a proposed mitigation strategy using Information Flow Control.